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Prior information about features of a stimulus is a strong modulator of perception. For instance, 
the prospect of more frequent or intense pain leads to an increased perception of pain whereas 
the expectation of analgesia reduces pain, as for instance shown in placebo analgesia and 
expectancy modulations during drug administration [1]. This influence is commonly assumed to 
be rooted in altered sensory processing (i.e., the amplified or attenuated excitability of 
ascending pathways and early sensory brain regions) and expectancy-related modulations in 
the spinal cord [2], for instance, are often taken as evidence for this notion.  
Contemporary models of perception, however, suggest that prior information can also 
modulate perception by biasing perceptual decision-making, i.e. the inferential process 
underlying perception in which prior information is used to interpret sensory information. 
Importantly, in this type of bias, the information is already present in the system before the 
stimulus is observed [3]. Computational models such as the drift diffusion model can distinguish 
between changes in sensory processing and altered decision-making as they differ in their 
pattern of response times for incorrect choices in a perceptual decision-making task (Figure 
1A,B; [4]). Using computational modeling, we investigated the influence of changes in sensory 
processing and altered perceptual decision-making on changes in pain related to prior 
probability information in two independent experiments. Results of both experiments strongly 
suggest that these changes in pain perception are predominantly based on altered perceptual 
decision-making rather than on changes in sensory processing.  
22 right-handed healthy volunteers (11 female; mean age: 26 years) took part in the study in 
Experiment 1. In a probabilistic cueing paradigm, participants were presented with one of two 
visual cues in each trial. Cue 1 signaled the subsequent application of a high intensity noxious 
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electrical stimulus with a probability of 80% and of a low intensity stimulus with a probability of 
20%. Cue 2 signaled an equal probability (i.e., 50%) for both high and low intensity stimuli. To 
test whether the results of Experiment 1 were specific for prior information about high 
intensity pain, we conducted a second experiment (N= 22; 11 female; mean age: 26 years) with 
an additional condition in which a third cue signaled a prior probability of 20% for low intensity 
pain and an 80% probability for high intensity pain. 
In both experiments, participants had to indicate as quickly as possible upon stimulus delivery 
whether they had received a low-intensity or high-intensity stimulation. Decision accuracy and 
response time were recorded as outcome parameters (Figure 1C-F). Using a hierarchical 
diffusion model [5], we compared the influence of the cues on drift rate (indicative of altered 
sensory processing) and on the starting point of the decision-making process (indicative of 
altered perceptual decision-making) by fitting a model that allowed for an influence of cue 
information on drift rate and starting point. Further free parameters of the model were non-
decision time and boundary separation (see Supplemental Information for details). For each of 
the four parameters, Bayesian paired contrast tests were applied to test for effects of cue 
condition (Experiment 1: ‘80/20’, ‘or ‘50/50’; Experiment 2: ‘80/20’, ‘20/80’ or ‘50/50’) and 
stimulation intensity (i.e., low or high) and their interactions.  
In both experiments, only the starting point showed a main effect of cue (for details see 
Supplemental Information), indicating that prior information biases perceptual decision-making. 
In Experiment 1, participants showed a shift in starting point towards high intensity pain in the 
‘80/20’ condition. In Experiment 2, the starting point was shifted towards high pain in the 
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‘80/20’ condition and towards low pain in the ‘20/80’ condition. The degree of shift in starting 
point away from the neutral starting point did not differ between the two conditions.  
Both datasets also showed changes in drift rate (indicating altered sensory processing), which 
were, however, more closely related to the stimulation intensity than the cue condition. In 
Experiment 1, low-intensity stimuli yielded higher drift rates than high-intensity stimuli, 
irrespective of the cue condition. In Experiment 2, the drift rate in the ‘20/80’ condition was 
significantly increased if high-intensity stimuli were applied, indicating a ‘pop-out’ effect of 
unexpectedly high stimuli. None of the remaining comparisons including those for non-decision 
time or boundary separation reached significance.  
The observation that prior information affects the perception of pain is not novel. There is 
ample evidence showing that pain can be amplified through negative expectations and reduced 
through expectations of pain relief [6]. However, neural mechanisms underlying these changes 
are still unclear. A prevalent explanation based on related studies using expectancy 
manipulations assumes that prior information changes the signal level in brain regions involved 
in processing sensory-discriminative aspects of pain. However, changes in pain perception can 
also be reflected in brain regions related to cognitive-affective processing [7,8]. Activation 
changes in sensory-discriminative brain regions are nevertheless considered the gold standard 
when proving genuine changes in pain perception as opposed to report bias.  
Our data suggest that cognitive pain modulation can also be rooted in altered perceptual 
decision-making. Over recent years, the conceptualization of perception as an inferential 
process has critically changed our understanding of perception – cognition interactions. The 
basic tenet of this account is that incoming sensory information are not analyzed de novo but 
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are interpreted based on prior information. As a consequence, incoming information is more 
likely to be interpreted in accordance with the more likely percept. To date, the effect of prior 
information on perceptual decisions has mainly been studied in basic visual processing [9–11] . 
Our data critically extend these findings by showing that biased perceptual decision-making is 
pivotal to the modulation of pain, one of the most common and costly health care problems 
worldwide.  
Our findings have several far-reaching implications. First, they challenge the current emphasis 
of neuroimaging studies investigating cognitive pain modulation on the search for changes in 
brain regions related to sensory-discriminative processing as too narrow. Research outside the 
pain domain has linked altered perceptual decision-making to activation changes in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), and the dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC; [9]) which have also been 
implicated in cognitive pain modulation [8]. Future studies have to identify neural processes 
underlying biased perceptual decision-making and probe their utility as objective indicators of 
pain modulation. Note that a bias in perceptual decision-making as observed here is not to be 
equated with report bias in which the report is decoupled from the perceptual process. Second, 
future studies have to specify the relative influence of processes such expectations, attention, 
uncertainty and feedback-driven learning that may underlie or mediate the effects of prior 
probability information and the specificity of our findings for other types of nociceptive inputs 
and pain experiences. Finally, it needs to be explored how our findings relate to previous 
studies in which the same stimulation intensity and probability was used in all conditions [1,2]. 
Modern conceptions of perception have begun to embrace evidence on cognitive influences 
onto perception. Our data strongly encourage this perspective to allow for a more 
comprehensive view on perception in general and clinical challenges such as pain in particular.   
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Figure legend 
Biased sensory processing or altered perceptual decision-making? If a higher prior probability 
for high-intensity pain leads to a change in sensory processing (A), incorrect responses are 
characterized by shorter responses times (RTs) relative to RTs under changes in perceptual 
decision-making (B). (C) and (D) show mean decision accuracies for the four experimental 
conditions in Experiment 1 (C) and the six conditions in Experiment 2 (D). (HP, high intensity 
pain; LP, low intensity pain). (E) and (F) depict mean response times for correct responses (light 
grey) and incorrect responses (dark grey; HP, high intensity pain; LP, low intensity pain). (G) and 
(H) show the group average of the modelling parameters starting point (left) and drift rate 
(right) in Experiment 1 (G) and Experiment 2 (H). The dashed line indicates a neutral starting 
point of 0.5 for reference. Figure 1A and 1B adapted from [10]. 
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Supplemental Data 
Experiment 1 
Decision accuracies. As expected, accuracy rates for high intensity pain were higher in the 
‘80/20’ than in the ‘50/50’ condition (t(33)= 4.19; p< 0.001; Figure 1C). Furthermore, accuracy 
rates for trials in which low intensity stimuli had been applied were higher in the ‘50/50’ 
condition compared to the ‘80/20’ condition (t(33)= -3.28; p= 0.002). A significant difference in 
accuracy was also found for the comparison of high and low intensity stimuli in the ‘50/50’ 
condition (t(33)= 4.47; p< 0.001) with higher accuracies for the low intensity stimuli.  
Response times (RTs). Fig. 1E shows RTs separately for correct and incorrect responses. In line 
with our finding of higher accuracies for the correctly cued high-intensity stimulation, 
participants were also faster in indicating their correct response when high-intensity stimuli had 
been preceded by the ‘80/20’ cue than by the ‘50/50’ cue (t(33)= -4.31; p< 0.001). Response 
times for the correct categorization of the low intensity stimuli, however, did not differ 
between both conditions (t(33)= 0.97; p= 0.338). Likewise, we found no significant difference in 
response time for the correct categorization of high and low intensity stimuli in the ‘50/50’ 
condition (t(33)= -1.24; p= 0.223). Turning to the incorrect responses, incorrect categorizations 
of high intensity stimuli did not differ between the two cue conditions (t(21)= 1.84; p= 0.079). 
Likewise the RT difference between incorrect responses to low pain stimuli following the 
‘80/20’ cue and the ‘50/50’ cue (t(12)= 2.14; p= 0.053) and the incorrect responses to the 
‘50/50’ cue for low and high intensity stimulation (t(14)= 2.13; p= 0.052) did not reach 
significance. However, in line with a decision-making bias, incorrect responses to the ‘80/20 
cue’ (i.e., categorization of high pain stimuli as low pain stimuli) were characterized by slower 
 14 
RTs compared to correct responses to the same cue (i.e., categorization of high pain stimuli as 
high pain stimuli).  
 
Experiment 2 
Decision accuracies. Analysis of mean decision accuracies indicated that cue condition, 
(F(1.94,40.81)= 3.48, p= 0.042), but not stimulation intensity (p> 0.05), influenced the correct 
categorisation of painful stimuli as being either low-intensity or high-intensity (see Figure 1D). 
However, post-hoc t-tests (corrected for multiple comparisons) revealed no statistically 
significant difference for either of the pairwise comparisons (all p> 0.05). [STILL HAVE to ADD 
COMPARISONS ACROSS STIM INTENSITIES] 
Furthermore, cue condition and stimulation intensity interacted to influence decision 
accuracies (F(1.70, 35.61)= 5.26, p= 0.013). To explore the nature of this interaction, we 
examined the influence of cue on decision accuracies following high-intensity and low-intensity 
pain separately. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons for the high intensity stimulation 
conditions did not reveal any significant effect (p> 0.05). In low intensity trials, participants 
made significantly more accurate decisions with the 50/50 cue than with the 80/20 cue (t(21)= 
2.80, p= 0.033) whereas differences between the 80/20 and 20/80 condition and between the 
20/80 and 50/50 cues were not significant (both p> 0.05). Last, accuracies for high-intensity 
trials and low-intensity trials in the ‘50/50’ condition did not differ (p > 0.05).  
Response times (RTs). Analysis of mean RTs of correctly classified trials revealed that condition 
and stimulation intensity alone did not influence RTs (p> 0.05 for both main effects) but 
showed a significant interaction (F(2,23.32)= 33.23; p< 0.001; Figure 1E). Bonferroni-corrected 
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pairwise comparisons of conditions with the same stimulation intensity showed that RTs in the 
‘80/20, high-intensity stimulation’ condition were significiantly shorter than in the ‘50/50’ 
(t(20)= 4.84) and the ‘20/80’ trials in which a high-intensity stimulus was applied (t(20)= 5.07; 
both p< 0.001). Furthermore, RTs of the ‘50/50’ condition were shorter than of the ‘20/80’ 
condition (t(20)= 3.04; p= 0.018). In the low intensity stimulation trials, the ‘20/80’ condition 
showed significantly shorter RTs than the ‘80/20’ condition (t(20)= 5.69) and the ‘50/50’ 
condition (t(20)= 6.48; both p< 0.001). The comparison between the ‘80/20’ and the ‘50/50’ 
condition did not reach significance. In incorrectly classified trials, both main effects (i.e., cue 
conditions and stimulation intensity) and their interaction were not significant.   
As in Experiment 1, we also directly compared correct and incorrect responses of trials in which 
either high or low intensity stimulation was more likely (i.e., in the ‘80/20’ and the ‘20/80/ 
condition). These analyses revealed significantly longer RTs in incorrect than correct trials in the 
‘80/20, high intensity stimulation’ trials (t(11)= 3.26, p= 0.32) and the ‘20/80, low intensity 
stimulation’ trials (t(10)= 3.48, p= 0.024).  
 
Diffusion model.  
Experiment 1 
Change in starting point (indicative of perceptual decision-making bias). As shown in Figure 1G 
(left), the starting point in the ‘80/20’ condition, β80:20, was significantly shifted towards high 
pain (upper boundary) compared to the ‘50/50’ condition (Pr(β80:20 ≤ β50:50) < 0.0001).
1  
                                                             
1
 Here and throughout, Pr(X) indicates the posterior probability that a proposition X is true, given the data at hand. 
If this probability is very low, the complement of X is inferred. The four parameters of the model are starting point 
β, drift rate δ, boundary separation α, and non-decision time τ. Subscripts refer to conditions or averages over 
conditions, as appropriate. See Table S1 and Table S2 for exact formulas for all contrasts. 
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Drift rate (indicative of altered sensory processing). The drift rate was significantly increased in 
the low-intensity trials compared to the high-intensity trials across both cue conditions (main 
effect of stimulation intensity; Pr(δlow ≤ δhigh) < 0.001). In contrast, the main effect of cue 
condition and the interaction between both factors did not reach significance.  
Non-decision time and boundary separation. Neither of the tested effects on non-decision 
time or boundary separation reached statistical significance. 
 
Experiment 2 
Change in starting point (indicative of perceptual decision-making bias). In Experiment 2 in 
which an additional third condition tested for the effects of prior information emphasizing low 
intensity stimulation, the starting point in the ‘20/80’ condition was shifted towards low pain 
(lower boundary) relative to the ‘50/50’ condition (Pr(β50:50 ≤ β20:80) < 0.01) and the ‘80/20’ 
condition (Pr(β80:20 ≤ β20:80) < 0.01). The starting point in the ‘80/20’ condition was clearly 
shifted towards high-intensity pain (see Figure 1H, left). The difference between the ‘80/20’ 
condition and the ‘50/50’ condition was less pronounced (Pr(β80:20 ≤ β50:50) ≈.04).   
Drift rate (indicative of altered sensory processing). Pairwise comparisons testing for an 
influence of cue condition and stimulation intensity on drift rates revealed a difference in drift 
rate between ‘20/80’ trials in which a high-intensity stimulation was applied and those in which 
the ‘20/80’ cue was followed by the low-intensity stimulation (Pr(δhigh,20:80 ≤ δlow,20:80) ≈ 0.02)). 
As shown in Figure 1H (right), the drift rate was higher when the ‘20/80’ cue was unexpectedly 
followed by a high-intensity stimulation compared to the expected low-intensity stimulation.  
Non-decision time and boundary separation. Neither of the tested effects on non-decision 
time or boundary separation revealed effects. 
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Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
Subjects. 34 right-handed healthy volunteers (23 female; mean age: 23.4 years) participated in 
Experiment 1 and 22 right-handed healthy volunteers (11 female; mean age: 26 years) took part 
in Experiment 2. Participants displayed normal pain thresholds at the site of stimulus 
application and had no history of neurological or psychiatric disease or chronic pain. All subjects 
participated having given full informed consent. The study was approved by the local Research 
Ethics committee.  
Experimental design. In a probabilistic cueing paradigm, participants were presented with one 
of two (Experiment 1) or three (Experiment 2) visual cues in each trial. One cue signaled the 
subsequent application of a high intensity noxious electrical stimulus with a probability of 80% 
and of a low intensity stimulus with a probability of 20% (‘80/20’ condition). The second cue 
signaled a prior probability of 50% for both high and low intensity stimuli (‘50/50’ condition). In 
Experiment 2, a third cue signaled the delivery of a high intensity stimulus in 20% of the trials 
and of a low-intensity stimulus in 80% of the trials. The visual cues (the white outline of a 
square, triangle or circle) were randomly assigned to the conditions across subjects. Three 
seconds after the onset of the visual cue, the noxious stimulation was applied to the dorsum of 
the left hand. Participants were instructed to indicate as quickly as possible (without 
compromising on accuracy) whether they had received a low-intensity or high-intensity 
stimulation by pressing one of two buttons with their right hand. The decision accuracy and 
response time (i.e., time between delivery of the noxious stimulus and button press) were 
recorded as outcome parameters. No feedback was provided regarding the correctness of the 
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response. Between consecutive trials a fixation cross was presented with a variable duration of 
three, five or seven seconds. In Experiment 2, participants also provided ratings of the average 
intensity of pain and the average amount of anxiety experienced with each of the three cues at 
the end of each of the four blocks (data not shown here).  
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 40 trials (Experiment 1) or 42 trials (Experiment 2) 
each. The order of conditions was pseudo-randomized in each block, with a maximum of two 
consecutive repetitions of the same condition. In Experiment 1, all participants underwent a 
practice run of 16 trials (eight 80/20 and eight 50/50 trials) before the actual experiment. In 
Experiment 2, they had to complete 24 practice trials (eight 80/20, eight 50/50 trials and 20/80 
trials). 
Electrical stimulation. Prior to the practice run, individual stimulation levels for high and low 
pain were determined using the Method of Limits approach [1]. The stimuli were applied to the 
back of the left hand using two commercial electric stimulation devices (Constant Current 
Stimulator, model DS7A; Digitimer©, Hertfordshire, UK) delivering a train of 1ms monopolar 
square waveform pulses via a concentric silver chloride electrode. Intensities rated as 2 on a 
Visual Analogue Scale ranging from 0 (= no pain) to 10 (= unbearable pain) were used for low 
pain, and intensities rated as VAS 6 were used for high pain. In Experiment 1, the average 
stimulation intensity was 1.43 mA (SD= 0.94) for low pain stimuli and 4.37 mA (SD= 3.37) for 
high pain stimuli with a significant difference between both stimulation levels (t(33)= -6.55; p< 
0.001). In Experiment 2, a mean stimulation intensity of 0.20 mA (SD= 0.15) was applied for 
low-intensity stimuli. The average intensity for high-intensity stimuli was 0.80 mA (SD= 0.73) 
which was significantly different from the low-intensity stimulation (t(20) = 4.72; p< 0.001). 
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Prior to each block the participants’ pain threshold was recalibrated if necessary to ensure 
constant pain levels throughout the experiment. To this end, a series of stimuli of both 
stimulation intensities (i.e., current level that had been used to induce low and high intensity 
pain in the previous block) was applied and participants provided a verbal intensity rating for 
each stimulus. In case the rating deviated from the intended VAS 2 for low intensity pain and 
VAS 6 for high intensity pain in more than two consecutive trials, the intensity was adjusted 
accordingly until the ratings matched the intended intensities.  
Experimental protocol. Upon arrival, participants were provided with a participant information 
sheet, were introduced to the experiment, familiarized with the equipment and they were 
given the possibility to ask questions. After they had provided informed consent, participants 
filled in the questionnaires on pain-related psychological measures (data not shown here). 
Subsequently, participants underwent the calibration procedure to determine the stimulation 
intensities required for the low level and the high level stimulation. Prior to the actual 
experiment, all participants completed a practice run (see above). Experiment 1 comprised four 
blocks of 40 trials each (20 trials of both conditions in a randomized order). Experiment 2 
consisted of four blocks of 42 trials each (14 trials of each of the three conditions in a 
randomized order).  
In order to test whether the low-intensity and the high-intensity stimulation were sufficiently 
different to allow for differential learning, participants performed a discrimination test prior to 
the practice run. In this stimulation discrimination test, ten low-intensity stimuli and ten high-
intensity stimuli, which were adjusted to the individual stimulation level determined during the 
preceding calibration procedure were applied in a randomized order. Participants had to 
verbally categorize each stimulus as either a low-intensity or a high-intensity stimulus. If 
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participants were able to classify at least 80% of the trials correctly, the actual experiment 
commenced. Categorization accuracies below 80% resulted in re-calibration and a second 
practice run, which was successfully performed by all participants who required more practice. 
Furthermore, participants underwent a short test in which their understanding of the 
contingencies between the visual cues and the subsequent stimulation was probed. All cues 
were presented ten times in a randomized order and participants had to verbally indicate 
whether the cue signaled a high-intensity stimulation in 80%, 50% or 20% of the trials. Note 
that participants were explicitly informed about the contingencies prior to the performance 
test. Only if participants were able to categorize at least 80% of the trials correctly, the actual 
experiment was started. All participants were able to categorize the cues correctly at the first 
practice run.  
Data analysis. All trials with a response time of two standard deviations above or below the 
group mean response time were excluded from the analysis (Experiment 1: mean exclusion 
rate: 3.4%; SD= 6.1; Experiment 2: mean exclusion rate: 4.3%; SD= 3.1). To characterize the 
effect of the cues on the decision, we first calculated the average response times (RT) for 
correct responses and accuracy rate (in % correct) separately for each conditions across the 
group. In Experiment 1, differences in RTs and accuracies between conditions were investigated 
for the following three comparisons using pairwise t-tests (adjusted for multiple comparisons 
using Bonferroni correction): (1) high pain(80%) vs. high pain(50%),  (2) high pain(50%) vs. low 
pain(50%), (3) low pain(20%) vs. low pain(50%). In Experiment 2, we performed a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the within-subject factors CUE CONDITION (i.e., ‘80/20’ cue, ‘50/50’ cue and 
‘20/80’ cue) and STIMULATION INTENSITY (i.e., low-intensity and high-intensity stimulation) 
with post-hoc t-tests (corrected for multiple comparisons) for both, RTs and accuracies.  
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Model fitting. We estimated parameters of the hierarchical diffusion model (HDM) using the 
procedure, methods, and software described in Vandekerckhove et al. [4] and Wabersich & 
Vandekerckhove [3]. In short, the model is based on the drift diffusion process [5,6] that is 
assumed to underlie binary perceptual decisions. In this framework of sequential sampling 
models [6], perception is understood as a statistical inference process in which sensory 
evidence is accumulated over time and the decision is made as soon as the upper or lower 
boundary is reached. Which boundary is reached determines which response is given. The most 
widely used model of the class of sequential sampling models is the diffusion model [7] which is 
a computational representation of the decision process and makes particular predictions for 
choice response probabilities and response times. The decision process is characterized by a 
number of parameters, including the mean starting point , the speed at which evidence is 
accumulated (i.e., the drift rate, ), the boundary separation a that indicates the evidence 
required to make a response and the non-decision time τ that indicates the time used for 
everything except making a decision (i.e., encoding the stimulus and physically executing the 
response).  
For two-choice decision-making we investigated here (i.e., the choice between high versus low 
intensity stimulation), there is a boundary for the correct response (responding “high”/”low” 
when the stimulus was high/low) and a boundary of an error response (responding 
“high”/”low” when the stimulus was low/high). The rate of information accumulation is related 
to the amount of information present in the stimulus. At the presentation of the stimulus, the 
information accumulation process starts in between the two boundaries. If a certain percept 
(e.g., high-intensity pain) is expected, the starting point in this inferential process will be closer 
to the corresponding correct boundary (e.g., boundary for high-intensity pain) and thereby 
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favor the expected percept. For instance, the cue that signals a prior probability of 80% for a 
high-intensity stimulation could shift the starting point towards the ‘high intensity’ decision 
boundary whereas the non-informative 50% probability cue can be expected to have no effect 
on the starting point. In the informative (i.e., 80%) compared to the non-informative (50%) 
trials, the shift in starting point is expected to lead to shorter response times during correct 
decisions, as well as a higher decision accuracy.  
A bias in drift rate, in contrast, is characterized by accelerated evidence accumulation. Like the 
bias in starting point, it is associated with higher decision accuracies and shorter response times 
during correct decisions in the ‘80/20’ relative to ‘50/50’ condition trials. Note, however, that 
both types of bias differ in their effect on response times in error trials. While a bias in starting 
point leads to longer response times when validly cued high intensity stimuli are erroneously 
classified as low intensity stimulation (relative to errors in the ‘50/50’ condition), a bias in drift 
rate is characterized by shorter response times in these trials. By jointly considering response 
times and decision accuracies, the drift diffusion model can differentiate between both types of 
bias.  
 
The classical drift diffusion model has proven useful in a variety of contexts. It does, however, 
not take into account the between-subject variability and is therefore less suitable for 
explaining inter-individual differences. In addition, studies in pain perception often administer 
only a modest number of trials (e.g., a few tens of trials rather than thousands as is common in 
standard psychophysical experiments). For such data structures, it is more advantageous to use 
hierarchical models so that information from different participants can be pooled [8]. 
Therefore, a recently developed statistical implementation of the drift diffusion model, the 
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hierarchical diffusion model (HDM; [4]) was applied. The HDM allows for the modeling of inter-
individual differences by considering differences in parameter values between participants as 
random effects in the statistical sense.  
Here, we fit the HDM in a Bayesian statistical framework, including both correct and incorrect 
trials.  With the hierarchical model, we make the implied assumption that participants were 
randomly drawn from a larger population.  The parameters to be estimated were the starting 
point, the drift rate, the boundary separation, and the non-decision time. The drift rate and 
non-decision time parameters were allowed to differ between all conditions of the experiment 
(four conditions in Experiment 1, six conditions in Experiment 2), while the boundary separation 
and starting point were allowed to differ as a function of task instruction only (two levels in 
Experiment 1, three levels in Experiment 2). Since these two parameters are by definition 
determined before the stimulus is presented and the information accumulation process starts, 
they cannot be affected by properties of the stimulus such as intensity.  As part of the Bayesian 
analysis, we defined prior distributions for each parameter that reflect our knowledge about 
the parameter prior to observing the data. We defined uniform priors (i.e., uninformative prior 
distributions that did not favor one value over another) within a reasonable range for each 
parameter (ranges informed by the review data in [9]; the results presented here were not 
sensitive to small changes in prior specification such as replacing a uniform distribution with a 
normal distribution with large variance).  We then base our statistical inferences on the 
posterior distributions of the parameters because they represent our state of knowledge about 
the parameters after having taken into account the data. We summarize these posterior 
distributions by their means (i.e., leading to expected a posteriori or EAP estimates) and 
perform statistical inference by computing tail areas of contrast parameters. For example, to 
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test whether the decision bias parameter  is closer towards the “high” boundary in the 50/50 
condition compared to the 20/80 condition, we evaluate the proposition 20:80 ≤ 50:50, and so 
compute the posterior probability that (20:80 - β50:50) ≤ 0. If this probability is high (greater than 
97.5%), we infer that 20:80 ≤ 50:50. If it is low (less than 2.5%), we infer that 20:80 > 50:50. If it is 
intermediate, we suspend judgment. Tail areas of contrast posteriors act as a Bayesian 
analogue to the classical p-value associated with a one-tailed test. Tables S1 and S2 contain all 
the planned contrasts expressed in terms of model parameters. 
 
Table S1. 
Summary statistics of the posterior distributions of all planned contrasts (Experiment 1). 
Parameter Effect Contrast (x) Mean SD p(x<0) 
α cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(α50:50, high - α80:20, high + α50:50, low - α80:20, low) / 2; -0.016 0.063 0.6002 
      
β cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(β50:50, high - β80:20, high + β50:50, low - β80:20, low) / 2; -0.160 0.038 1.0000 
      
τ intensity 
high - low 
(τ80:20, high + τ50:50, high - τ80:20, low - τ50:50, low) / 2; 0.023 0.015 0.0595 
τ cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(τ50:50, high - τ80:20, high + τ50:50, low - τ80:20, low) / 2; -0.001 0.015 0.5267 
τ interaction 
50:50 - 
80:20 
(τ50:50, high - τ80:20, high - τ50:50, low + τ80:20, low); 0.044 0.030 0.0684 
      
δ intensity 
high - low 
(δ80:20, high + δ50:50, high - δ80:20, low - δ50:50, low) / 2; 1.452 0.312 0.0000 
δ cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(δ50:50, high - δ80:20, high + δ50:50, low - δ80:20, low) / 2; -0.157 0.301 0.7005 
δ interaction 
50:50 - 
80:20 
(δ50:50, high - δ80:20, high - δ50:50, low + δ80:20, low); -0.591 0.618 0.8317 
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Table S2. 
Summary statistics of the posterior distributions of all planned contrasts (Experiment 2). 
Parameter Effect Contrast (x) Mean SD p(x<0) 
α cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(α50:50, high - α80:20, high + α50:50, low - α80:20, low) / 2 0.024 0.119 0.4266 
α cue 20:80 - 
50:50 
(α20:80, high - α50:50, high + α20:80, low - α50:50, low) / 2 0.045 0.123 0.3348 
α cue 20:80 - 
80:20 
(α20:80, high - α80:20, high + α20:80, low - α80:20, low) / 2 0.069 0.113 0.2706 
      
β cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(β50:50, high - β80:20, high + β50:50, low - β80:20, low) / 2 -0.09 0.048 0.9616 
β cue 20:80 - 
50:50 
(β20:80, high - β50:50, high + β20:80, low - β50:50, low) / 2 -0.182 0.05 0.9953 
β cue 20:80 - 
80:20 
(β20:80, high - β80:20, high + β20:80, low - β80:20, low) / 2 -0.272 0.061 0.9962 
β distance 
from 50:50 
(β20:80, high - 2β50:50, high + β80:20, high + β20:80, low - 
2β50:50, low + β80:20, low)/2  
-0.093 0.076 0.8887 
β distance 
from β = 0.5 
((β20:80, high - 0.5) - (0.5 - β80:20, high) + (β20:80, low - 
0.5) - (0.5 - β80:20, low))/2  
-0.013 0.042 0.6205 
      
τ intensity 
high - low 
(τ80:20, high + τ50:50, high + τ20:80, high - τ80:20, low - τ50:50, 
low - τ20:80, low) / 3 
0.017 0.018 0.1729 
τ cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(τ50:50, high - τ80:20, high + τ50:50, low - τ80:20, low) / 2 0.028 0.022 0.1011 
τ cue 20:80 - 
50:50 
(τ20:80, high - τ50:50, high + τ20:80, low - τ50:50, low) / 2 -0.044 0.024 0.96 
τ cue 20:80 - 
80:20 
(τ20:80, high - τ80:20, high + τ20:80, low - τ80:20, low) / 2 -0.015 0.021 0.7605 
τ interaction 
50:50 - 
80:20 
(τ50:50, high - τ80:20, high - τ50:50, low + τ80:20, low) -0.036 0.045 0.7904 
τ interaction 
20:80 - 
50:50 
(τ20:80, high - τ50:50, high - τ20:80, low + τ50:50, low) 0.033 0.047 0.2261 
τ interaction 
20:80 - 
80:20 
(τ20:80, high - τ80:20, high - τ20:80, low + τ80:20, low) -0.003 0.05 0.4995 
      
δ intensity 
high - low 
(δ80:20, high + δ50:50, high + δ20:80, high - δ80:20, low - 
δ50:50, low - δ20:80, low) / 3 
-0.054 0.184 0.6149 
δ cue 50:50 - 
80:20 
(δ50:50, high - δ80:20, high + δ50:50, low - δ80:20, low) / 2 0.119 0.205 0.2782 
δ cue 20:80 - 
50:50 
(δ20:80, high - δ50:50, high + δ20:80, low - δ50:50, low) / 2 0.041 0.206 0.4201 
 26 
δ cue 20:80 - 
80:20 
(δ20:80, high - δ80:20, high + δ20:80, low - δ80:20, low) / 2 0.16 0.209 0.2211 
δ interaction 
50:50 - 
80:20 
(δ50:50, high - δ80:20, high - δ50:50, low + δ80:20, low) -0.164 0.473 0.6444 
δ interaction 
20:80 - 
50:50 
(δ20:80, high - δ50:50, high - δ20:80, low + δ50:50, low) -1.009 0.477 0.9795 
δ interaction 
20:80 - 
80:20 
(δ20:80, high - δ80:20, high - δ20:80, low + δ80:20, low) -1.173 0.55 0.969 
δ pop-out 
20:80 
δ20:80, low - δ20:80, high 0.782 0.356 0.0200 
δ pop-out 
50:50 
δ50:50, low - δ50:50, high -0.228 0.309 0.7713 
δ pop-out 
80:20 
δ80:20, low - δ80:20, high -0.392 0.361 0.8704 
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APPENDIX 
 
Here we provide additional information about the definition of the hierarchical diffusion model used in 
Wiech et al. (submitted). Reference: 
Katja Wiech, Joachim Vandekerckhove, Jonas Zaman, Francis Tuerlinckx, Johan W.S. Vlaeyen, 
Irene Tracey (submitted). Influence of prior information on pain involves biased perceptual 
decision-making. Current Biology. 
The model was fit in JAGS using the jags-wiener plugin for the diffusion model. MATLAB was used to 
interface with JAGS. MATLAB code can be obtained from Joachim Vandekerckhove. 
FULL DEFINITION OF THE HIERARCHICAL DIFFUSION MODEL: JAGS CODE 
 
model { 
    # Priors 
    v.mu[1,1] ~ dunif(-5.00, 5.00)    # 80/20, high 
    v.mu[1,2] ~ dunif(-5.00, 5.00)    # 80/20, low 
    v.mu[2,1] ~ dunif(-5.00, 5.00)    # 50/50, high 
    v.mu[2,2] ~ dunif(-5.00, 5.00)    # 50/50, low 
    v.mu[3,1] ~ dunif(-5.00, 5.00)    # 20/80, high 
    v.mu[3,2] ~ dunif(-5.00, 5.00)    # 20/80, low 
 
    b.mu[1,1]   ~ dunif( 0.01, 0.99)  # 80/20, high 
    b.mu[2,1]   ~ dunif( 0.01, 0.99)  # 50/50, high 
    b.mu[3,1]   ~ dunif( 0.01, 0.99)  # 20/80, high 
    b.mu[1,2]   <- b.mu[1,1]          # 80/20, low 
    b.mu[2,2]   <- b.mu[2,1]          # 50/50, low 
    b.mu[3,2]   <- b.mu[3,1]          # 20/80, low 
 
    Ter.mu[1,1] ~ dunif( 0.05, 1.00)  # 80/20, high 
    Ter.mu[1,2] ~ dunif( 0.05, 1.00)  # 80/20, low 
    Ter.mu[2,1] ~ dunif( 0.05, 1.00)  # 50/50, high 
    Ter.mu[2,2] ~ dunif( 0.05, 1.00)  # 50/50, low 
    Ter.mu[3,1] ~ dunif( 0.05, 1.00)  # 20/80, high 
    Ter.mu[3,2] ~ dunif( 0.05, 1.00)  # 20/80, low 
 
    a.mu[1,1]   ~ dunif( 0.40, 3.00)  # 80/20, high 
    a.mu[2,1]   ~ dunif( 0.40, 3.00)  # 50/50, high 
    a.mu[3,1]   ~ dunif( 0.40, 3.00)  # 20/80, high 
    a.mu[1,2]   <- a.mu[1,1]          # 80/20, low 
    a.mu[2,2]   <- a.mu[2,1]          # 50/50, low 
    a.mu[3,2]   <- a.mu[3,1]          # 20/80, low 
 
    a.sd   ~ dunif( 0.001, 0.50)  # population SD for a 
    a.tau   <- pow(a.sd, -2) 
    b.sd   ~ dunif( 0.001, 0.25)  # population SD for b 
    b.tau   <- pow(b.sd, -2) 
    Ter.sd ~ dunif( 0.001, 0.30)  # population SD for Ter 
    Ter.tau <- pow(Ter.sd, -2) 
    v.sd   ~ dunif( 0.001, 3.00)  # population SD for v 
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    v.tau   <- pow(v.sd, -2) 
 
    st     ~ dunif(0.001, 0.30)  # inter-trial SD for Ter 
    pt      <- pow(st, -2) 
 
    # Hierarchical level 
    for(p in 1:P) {  # persons 
        for (i in 1:I) {  # intensities 
           for (t in 1:C) {  # cues 
                b[t,i,p]   ~ dnorm(b.mu[t,i]  , b.tau  )T( 0.01, 0.99) 
                a[t,i,p]   ~ dnorm(a.mu[t,i]  , a.tau  )T( 0.10, 3.50) 
                Ter[t,i,p] ~ dnorm(Ter.mu[t,i], Ter.tau)T( 0.00,     ) 
                v[t,i,p]   ~ dnorm(v.mu[t,i]  , v.tau  )T(-7.50, 7.50) 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    # Likelihood 
    for (i in 1:N) 
    { 
        ai[i] <- a[shape[i], intensity[i], person[i]] 
        bi[i] <- b[shape[i], intensity[i], person[i]] 
        vi[i] <- v[shape[i], intensity[i], person[i]] 
        ti[i] ~ dnorm(Ter[shape[i], intensity[i], person[i]], pt) 
        y[i] ~ dwiener(ai[i], ti[i], bi[i], vi[i])  # likelihood 
    } 
} 
 
